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a b s t r a c t
Thirty years ago, Adams (1981) depicted a future UK where everyone was a millionaire lorry driver, simply by
extrapolating from contemporary ofﬁcial transport growth assumptions. These assumptions underpinned the
‘predict and provide’ approach which then characterised transport planning. Twenty years later, the New Deal
for TransportWhite Paper (1998) abandoned ‘predict and provide’ as unsustainable. This paper argues that the
same growth assumptions that Adams took to their logical (absurd) conclusion have re-emerged to deﬁne both
transport and the drivers of transport demand. While non-aviation transport is supposed to be carbon-neutral
by 2050, the implied reductions in emissions rely on an absolute decoupling of transport demand and its
drivers for which there is no evidence in current planning. Targets rely on optimistic, narrowly framed
technology forecasts and behaviour change assumptions which appear highly unlikely in the present socio-
political climate. Moreover, such is the cost of mitigating these tensions between economic growth and other
concerns, it is argued that the targeted outcomes of current policy are as undesirable as they are unlikely. The
paper concludes by calling for a transport policy which considers mobility in an integrated, holistic fashion,
rather than merely as a dimension of economic growth.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
1. Introduction
Politics can be characterised as the management of contra-
dictions. Transport planning is no exception. The contemporary
planner faces a series of conﬂicts, most pressingly the reconcilia-
tion of energy security, carbon emission targets, mobility
demands, and economic growth. This challenge is often avoided
by undertaking narrowly bounded modelling exercises that simply
assume the continuance of selected trends considered to be
desirable. The limitations of this practice were demonstrated more
than 30 years ago by Adams (1981), pp. 204–206, who constructed
an ‘absurd scenario’ based on a literal reading of contemporary UK
government plans for meeting perpetual transport growth. The
absurdity emerges when reintegrating the isolated trends into a
coherent world view. By the year 2205 – according to ofﬁcial
models – average annual income would reach d1 m, with one lorry
on the road for every man, woman and child. Adams’ describes
such a world, in which the population would spend its days in
these lorries, endlessly roaming the English “tarmac plain” (ibid.
p. 206) in the hunt for consumables.
Adams’ scenario is the logical outcome of ‘predict and provide’
thinking: the continual expansion of transport infrastructure to
meet inferred latent demand. The resulting future appears very
different one from the one legally mandated by the UK’s Climate
Change Act 2008. This future is outlined by the Committee on
Climate Change (CCC), tasked under the Act to identify means of
achieving 80% cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050,
and monitor progress towards them. To date it has produced a
number of Carbon Budgets (CCC, 2008; CCC, 2010), which include
a target of 26% reduction (relative to 2008) in transport emissions
by 2020, and 44% reduction by 2030.
For 2050, the only transport-speciﬁc target is for UK aviation
emissions, which are expected to return to 2005 levels of 35 MtCO2e,
equivalent to 20% of current transport emissions. Given the overall
2050 target of 80% reductions, this effectively means that the rest of
the transport sector, including maritime, must be entirely carbon
free, unless other sectors take up the slack.
An important commonality with Adams’ scenario remains
however – the perpetuation of economic growth, increasing by
62% by 2030. To avoid the kind of ecological devastation Adams
invokes, the CCC requires a radical decoupling of transport emis-
sions from GDP, the scale of which is shown in (Fig. 1). The future
envisioned by the CCC then is one where the primary determi-
nants of transport demand continue to grow strongly, while
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related emissions are radically reduced. Its framing is one of the
‘sustainable development’, following the Brundtland Report
(WCED 1987), which sought to reconcile competing demands for
growth and environmental protection.
This paper considers the possibility of such radical carbon
reductions in light of the recent history of UK transport policy,
beginning in 1997, when the New Labour Government declared an
intention to abandon predict and provide road building, in the
White Paper New Deal for Transport (Dept of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions (DETR), 1998). Following Adams’
example, the paper will situate transport in a wider context, in
which predict and provide is read as a sector-speciﬁc form of a
dominant market-led growth agenda.
Section 2 discusses how, in the New Deal for Transport, mobility
would be managed by central and local planners in such a way as to
direct travellers to themost appropriate modes and, where possible, to
reduce the need for travel at all. Present trends would not be projected
unquestioningly into the future. Section 3 assesses the links between
transport emissions and GDP during this period, ﬁnding that, while
they weakened, success was limited, and driven by factors which may
have already run their course. In practice, the policy management of
mobility was quickly circumscribed. Section 4 shows how subsequent
models have returned to endless growth, and to the outcomes
satirized by Adams. Section 5 acknowledges that predict and provide
has broadened from the road-building ﬁxation of previous iterations,
but concludes that it remains subject to a neo-liberal vision of market-
led governance that leaves policy makers with few options for
achieving carbon reduction targets. Current strategy rests on wishful
thinking about changing behaviour (Section 6) or technological ﬁxes
(Section 7), neither of which is likely to resolve the conﬂicts between
mobility demands, economic growth, energy security and climate
change. The result is less the management of contradiction than its
aggravation. We conclude that current policy thinking is unlikely to
produce the resolution required. Transport policy debates need to
expand beyond a narrow focus on a particular approach to economic
growth, and consider mobility in a broader sense as a social good that
may need to be balanced against others.
2. Managing demand?
‘A New Deal for Transport’ (DETR, 1998) has been hailed as a
pivotal moment in UK transport planning (Goodwin, 1999). In the
second half of the twentieth century motor car ownership and use
had increased rapidly. As early as the 1960s there was a realisation,
documented in the inﬂuential Buchanan report ‘Trafﬁc in Towns’
(Ministry of Transport, 1963), that unlimited use of motor vehicles
could not reasonably be sustained, particularly in urban areas.
However, the policy of building roads and associated infrastructure
in direct response to trafﬁc growth continued for the next three
decades. This programme reached its apex with the 1989 Roads for
Prosperity White Paper, when the Conservative Government com-
mitted to doubling the scale of the existing road building pro-
gramme to d12bn (d25bn in 2012 prices), in order to provide a “vital
further boost for British industry” (Department of Transport, 1989).
In this context, New Labour’s White Paper appeared radical:
“Simply building more and more roads is not the answer to trafﬁc
growth. ‘Predict and provide’ didn’t work” (DETR, p. 5). Despite the
huge investment in roads under preceding governments, conges-
tion was increasingly costly for businesses; vehicle emissions were
growing, contributing to climate change and local air pollution;
and a mobility gap was widening between those with, and with-
out, cars. Policy would focus on alternatives to the car, with
improvements to public transport, cycling and walking facilities,
and freight moved from roads onto rail and waterways. The drivers
for travel demand would be tackled by encouraging more localized
employment and services.
These changes were captured in the concept of “transport demand
management” (TDM) (Ison and Rye, 2008) or, in the US, “travel demand
management”, deﬁned as “any action or set of actions aimed at
inﬂuencing people’s travel behaviour in such a way that alternative
mobility options are presented and/or congestion is reduced” (Meyer,
1999). Rather than building new roads, the UK government would
maintain the existing network and manage it more efﬁciently. In this
respect, it resembled many of the other initiatives of the early years of
New Labour, particularly in health care, which deliberately set out to
reverse the previous Conservative government’s reliance on market
mechanisms. The White Paper’s policy goals included providing a level
ﬁeld for choice between different transport modes, ensuring efﬁcient
integration between them, and setting targets for sustainable policies.
The new approach encouraged multi-modal studies (DETR, 2000a),
where all forms of transport, including walking and cycling, were
considered. The paradigm shift was captured by the ‘Management’ of
TDM:where ‘predict and provide’ sought to identify, and cater to, latent
demand – following rather than leading market forces – TDM would
proactively shape it according to long term planning goals. This was
required because of the difﬁculty for markets in internalising indirect
and/or delayed costs such as increased congestion and pollution.
3. Decoupling transport
The ‘coupling’ of transport and GDP has long been recognised:
the high mobility of people and goods enabled by oil-fuelled
Fig. 1. Absolute decoupling of UK emissions from majors drivers assumed in CCC Fourth Carbon Budget (2010). Dashed lines for 2030–2050 extrapolated from 2010–2030
trends as these variables only modelled to 2035 currently. Trajectories simpliﬁed to straight lines.
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transport was a deﬁning feature of twentieth century develop-
ment, underpinning fundamental reconﬁgurations of time and
space at all scales from suburbanisation to globalisation (Dennis
and Urry, 2009; Kunstler, 2006). In the early 1990s, Bennathan
et al.’s assessment for the World Bank, found that, in developed
countries, freight “[t]on-kilometers by road are chieﬂy explained by
GDP” (1992: summary). The adoption of TDM was ultimately an
attempt to decouple transport and/or associated emissions from
economic growth. Given the ambitious decoupling that future
carbon planning sets out, it is important to consider this recent
history and its implications.
Over the last two decades, the relationship appears to have
weakened signiﬁcantly in the UK. Between 1997 and 2007, the
ratio of freight tonne-kilometres (by inland transport – road, rail
and waterways) to GDP declined by 21%, while the ratio of
passenger-km (by inland transport – cars, buses, coaches and
trains) to GDP fell by 19% (Eurostat 2011). Total transport emis-
sions rose by just over 10% (DfT, 2010a), while GDP rose by 33%
(ukpublicspending.co.uk, 2011). These ﬁgures show that ‘relative’
or “weak decoupling”1 (Tapio, 2005) – that is slower rates of
growth in transport than GDP – has happened in recent years.
In light of this, New Labour’s decision to abandon ‘predict and
provide’ road building in favour of TDMmight appear to have been
successful. Road expansion shows a clear reduction commensurate
with the 1998 White Paper(Fig. 2). Considered alongside the
slower rate of growth in trafﬁc emissions relative to the wider
economic context (Fig. 3), it is easy to assume that the policy
change has considerably suppressed the sector’s energy demands
and carbon emissions without constraining economic growth. This
in turn gives reason to be optimistic about future targets.
McKinnon’s (2007) analysis of UK road freight – responsible for
20% of transport sector emissions – suggests, however, that the real
picture is more complex. During the period of analysis (1997–2004)
the measured elasticity between GDP and road freight was a promis-
ing 0.37, which is to say freight only grew at a third the rate of GDP.
However, McKinnon attributes 33% of this decoupling to a recording
bias, namely the increased penetration of the UK haulage market by
foreign companies, who are not included in the ﬁgures. A further 22%
is due to freight switching to rail or waterways. While this achieves a
signiﬁcant reduction in emissions, it does not eliminate them.
Fig. 2. Post-1980 road network length showing reduced growth following 1998 White Paper.
Note: A Roads fall in 1993 is due to change in classiﬁcation scheme, and should be disregarded (DfT, 2012).
Fig. 3. Relative decoupling of UK transport emissions from GDP observed over last two decades. Emissions data from DfT 2010a, GDP data from (ukpublicspending.co.uk,
2011).
1 ‘Weak decoupling’ is deﬁned as the elasticity between emissions and GDP
being between 0 and 0.8, where 0 is no relationship and 1 is a perfect relationship.
In effect, what is meant by weak decoupling is that emissions continue to rise with
(footnote continued)
GDP, but at a slower rate. ‘Strong decoupling’ (elasticity o0) sees emissions plateau
or fall as GDP rises.
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Other factors considered to make a “signiﬁcant” or “very
signiﬁcant” contribution to the low recorded elasticity include a
change in the composition of GDP; and export of industrial activity
to other countries. Both are problematic for future carbon targets.
The changing composition of GDP reﬂected a shift from manufac-
turing to services, which was encouraged by previous govern-
ments. The present coalition government is now trying to reverse
this trend, with associated implications for transport demand.2
If successful, a reversal of previous decoupling could be expected.
Even if this particular policy shift proves to be mainly rhetorical,
there are likely to be limits to the possibility of further shifts from
manufacturing to services (Stern, 2011). While the export of
industrial activity may be welcomed from the standpoint of UK
targets, it is of little beneﬁt globally. Indeed, such ‘carbon leakage’
may increase global emissions when the result is manufacturing in
more carbon-intensive economies like China (Li and Hewitt, 2008).
Neither transport metrics nor the CCC’s UK carbon budgets capture
the carbon ‘embodied’ in imported products. Its impact is recorded
only in terms of freight emissions, a fraction of the actual
environmental impact, which still exists off the balance sheet.
Calculating embodied emissions is difﬁcult, but the effect seems to
be considerable, adding an additional 16.6% (Peters and Hertwich
2008) to 50% (Davis and Caldeira 2010) to total UK recorded
emissions.
The picture for personal mobility is also complex. Between
1998 and 2007 total trips taken fell by around 5%, while distance
travelled and time taken remained static (DfT, 2013a). Since the
2008 recession, clear falls have occurred: average annual total
distance travelled fell 3.9% between 2007 and 2011 (DfT, 2013b).
There is evidence that, in regard to car travel, an absolute
decoupling from GDP was achieved: during the period of eco-
nomic growth between 1998 and 2007, car travel fell 3.1%; and
during the subsequent contraction, it has declined by a further
4.2% up to 2011 (Fig. 4). It was only signiﬁcant growth in rail
(26.9%) and local bus travel (9.6%) that kept overall travel ﬁgures
stable prior to 2007.
In summary, some relative decoupling of transport emissions
and GDP is likely to have been achieved since the late 1990s. For
freight it is, however, probably weaker than ofﬁcial data suggest,
and partly the result of factors, like offshoring manufacturing, that
may reverse or are actually counter-productive as responses
to climate change. DfT ﬁgures do suggest TDM and associated
policies such as the Fuel Price Escalator3 were successful in
retarding private car use despite rising GDP, but overall travel
only fell following the 2008 economic crash. Ultimately, between
1998 and 2007, total emissions from domestic transport still rose
3.3%. When combined with UK international transport emissions,
the increase was 8.5%. While signiﬁcantly below the 25%
increase in GDP during this period, this remains far from ‘absolute
decoupling’ of transport emissions from GDP – emissions reducing
while GDP grows, as required to reconcile economic growth with a
100% decrease in non-aviation transport emissions.
4. The resurrection of predict and provide
The limited nature of the decoupling achieved since the 1998
White Paper should come as little surprise for, in practice, the New
Labour Government’s commitment to TDM was questionable from
the beginning. The tone was set by its support for the private
member’s bill4 which became The Road Trafﬁc Reduction Act 1997,
a precursor to the White Paper. As a step towards reducing trafﬁc,
it required councils to produce reports on local trafﬁc levels, but
made no steps beyond this. As such it was attacked for “lack[ing]
teeth” (Chisholm, 1997) even before the White Paper’s publication.
Though the White Paper’s intentions were widely welcomed, their
implementation was criticized (Goodwin 1999) and they soon became
muddled. A Ten Year Plan produced in 2000 (DETR, 2000b), focusing
on transport delivery, was more concerned with investment in roads
and railways than with non-motorised modes, and downgraded
environmental concerns and demand management in favour of the
motor car and road building. Responsibility for TDM measures was
placed on local authorities, with little national support to realise the
Fig. 4. Relative decoupling of UK average distance travelled from GDP. Travel data from (DfT, 2013b), GDP data from (measuringworth.com, 2013).
2 The ‘knowledge economy’ discourse common during the New Labour years is
now being replaced by statements such as this as this from Chancellor George
Osborne: “Derby is a great example of what Britain’s economy should be in the
future […] [a]nd a strong endorsement of the importance of manufacturing
industry […]We have to get this country making things again” (BBC, 2011). Of
course to what degree this rhetoric leads to concrete actions and outcomes remains
to be seen.
3 The Fuel Price Escalator was a mechanism by which duty on fuel increased
annually. Though formally abandoned in 2000 following protests against fuel costs,
subsequent governments have continued to increase the duty.
4 A private members bill is one introduced by a Member of Parliament who is
not a government minister and which does not form an ofﬁcial part of the
government‘s legislative programme.
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vision (Docherty and Shaw, 2008). Begg and Gray (2004) argued that a
combination of public dissatisfaction with progress in transport,
political shocks (primarily the national fuel duty protests in 2000,
when reﬁneries were blockaded) and institutional change led to a
policy shift. With the focus on the problems of congestion, rather than
pollution, and on the expansion of transport infrastructure, they
asserted that the ‘marriage’ between transport and environmental
policy was over. The challenge of reconciling these tensions through
central planning had been abandoned almost before it had begun, and
primacy had been ceded once more to market forces.
New Labour’s abandonment of predict and provide and the
return to passive governance appears borne out in ofﬁcial projec-
tions of futures in which the market’s insatiable appetite for
economic growth is displayed in simple statistical extrapolations.
Key trends roll on indeﬁnitely and government appears only to
provide matching infrastructure. The questions raised by Adams,
and by the ‘limits to growth’ school founded on the work of the
Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972) and Hirsch (1977), are
accommodated through modelling exercises that either assume a
break in the historical link between these trends and their costs
(i.e. the decoupling of transport and carbon emissions) or simply
do not consider them.
A New Deal for Transport acknowledged that the indeﬁnite
expansion of road travel was not possible in a world of ﬁnite
resources, whether spatial, material, ﬁscal, or social. Transport
planning no longer questions this. The DfT’s Road Transport
Forecasts up to 2035 (DfT, 2009) assume that trafﬁc (vehicle
kms) will increase by 43% on 2003 levels, driven by GDP growth
of 2.2% per annum. This would value the UK economy at d3.3tn in
2050 (at 2005 prices), an increase of 139% on 2010. These forecasts
are linked to projections of a continuing increase in the UK
population (Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2011) with a central
estimate of 71.4 m by 2030. There seems to be a positive relation-
ship between economic growth and population growth, not least
in terms of the contribution from immigration: the more economic
growth the UK experiences, the greater the population growth and
transport demand (Mitchell and Pain, 2003). This population is
predicted to be older and living in an increasing number of
households: the latter has a strong impact on travel demand
(Giuliano and Dargay, 2006) and resource use more generally
(Liu et al., 2003). The DfT’s own TEMPro model5 forecasts house-
holds increasing by 27% to 33 m in 2030 (CCC, 2010, p. 126). The
Government’s other major modelling exercise – DECC’s 2050
Pathway Analysis – assumes similar growth (indeed stronger
growth in respect of GDP): “over the 40 year period the population
grows by 25%, the number of households by 50% and GDP by almost
200%” (2010, p. 34).
5. Taking stock and looking ahead
UK transport policy has not simply turned full circle to its pre-
1997 state. The ﬁxation on new road building has clearly ebbed, with
rail and aviation taking more prominent roles. The UK’s current
ﬂagship transport project is High Speed 2, a 250 mph rail line that
will initially connect London to Birmingham, at an expected cost of
around d20bn. Though it marks a break with the road-building of
earlier decades, it remains a predict and provide project: responding
to anticipated market demand rather than seeking to shape it.
Although a proposed second stage will link the economically lagging
northern cities, the build order suggests that HS2 is primarily
focussed on moving UK residents in and out of London more quickly
and in greater numbers. The government has simultaneously claimed
that HS2 will promote environmental goals: Philip Hammond, then
Transport Secretary, declared that “[HS2] would help us to build a
sustainable economy – by encouraging millions of people out of cars
and off planes onto trains.” (Hammond, 2011). The government’s
own document states, however, that its effect on transport sector
emissions will be neutral (DfT, 2010b, p. 16). The original 2007 study,
commissioned by the DfT to consider the carbon implications of high
speed rail, based on a London-Manchester route, found that, once
construction was taken into account, 35% more CO2 would be
produced than by equivalent car trafﬁc (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2007).
Furthermore, by enabling regular commuting from Birming-
ham to London, HS2 also creates a new possibility for high carbon
behaviour. Without the complete decarbonisation of energy sup-
ply, HS2 cannot hope to contribute even to relative carbon
reductions. The wisdom of further concentrating growth in the
London area is unquestioned. In sustainability terms, this is the UK
region with the densest population, the highest house prices, the
greatest demand on land for new housing, the highest levels of
road congestion (DfT, 2010c), and greatest projected water stresses
in coming decades (Environment Agency, 2008, p. 1). Parts of the
region already have less water per person than Sudan
(Environment Agency, 2007, p. 6).
Despite repeatedly delaying decisions on airport expansions
around London, the Government’s targeted growth in aviation –
despite the challenges it poses for carbon targets – provides
further evidence of market-driven planning. The non-economic
costs of airport expansion, particularly in the form of local
resistance in such a heavily populated area, could ultimately prove
so intractable that much of the planned-for trafﬁc ﬁnds its way to
alternative European hubs. Graham (2008) describes this as
“’predicting but not really providing’, of coming to terms with
the environmental dilemma entirely by default” (p. 158). Such an
outcome would demonstrate the fragility of predict and provide
planning when limits externalised by its processes impose them-
selves regardless. This is something we return to in Sections 7 and 8.
Road building also appears to be accelerating once again. Road
capacity has been expanding at an increasing rate since 2000 by
adding lanes to existing roads (Fig. 5). Looking ahead, in the 2013
Budget, Chancellor George Osborne committed to “spending more
on new roads than in a generation” (Osborne, 2013).
Greater recognition of the costs of mobility has led to some
TDM successes, notably London’s Congestion Charge. There is
acknowledgement of the promise of integrated transport, even if
this has yet to be realised (Givoni and Banister, 2010). However,
predict and provide remains embedded within transport policy,
for the simple reason that transport remains subservient to the
economic growth agenda (Owens and Cowell, 2011, Chapter 5).
Even at TDM’s moment of adoption in 1997, it appears that this
subservience was never challenged. Instead ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ provided the salve that would mitigate any pain from
acknowledging limits: growth would continue untroubled.
The speed with which predict and provide returned signals
how unsuited TDM is to the current era of neo-liberal governance.
Market demand in the South East spurs the construction of HS2
and future airport expansion. The continuing growth of GDP,
supported by an expanding population (whether migrants moving
into the economic area or, in the case of HS2, expanding the
economic area outwards) only seems possible with complemen-
tary growth in mobility. Predict and provide is not the source of
the tension, but simply a transport-speciﬁc manifestation of the
neo-liberal model adopted in pursuit of the growth paradigm:
[T]he model allows governments to treat the operations of markets
and corporations per se as ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the societal frame of
5 The Trip End Model Presentation Program (TEMPro) forecasts future travel
demand and is used by the DfT for transport planning.
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reference […] while government’s role is limited to enabling,
rather than leading or directing (Webb, 2012, pp. 112–113).
This approach limits the options for governments. If their role
is merely to respond to or enable market demands, then the
resulting conﬂicts cannot be addressed by pre-emptive manage-
ment of those demands. The options are effectively limited to
attempts to achieve ‘voluntary’ changes in the market choices of
individuals or corporations, or hoping that new technologies will
come to the rescue and create forms of mobility that do not
generate carbon emissions. In the ﬁnal two sections, we consider
these options. In the near-term, technology offers few opportu-
nities for lowering transport emissions, so behaviour change is
crucial (Hickman and Banister, 2007, p. 384), and accordingly that
is where we begin.
6. Changing travel behaviour
The appetite of contemporary governments for direct regula-
tion of behaviour in areas like security does not extend to
challenging major economic interests (Fisher, 2009; Judt, 2010).
Here voluntary initiatives are preferred, demonstrated most dra-
matically in the ‘nudge’ phenomenon, derived from Thaler and
Sunstein’s (2009) inﬂuential behavioural economics book. Nudge
approaches have become central to the current UK Government’s
policy framework, to the extent that Prime Minister Cameron has
created a ‘nudge unit’ within the Cabinet Ofﬁce. As the term
suggests, nudge attempts to encourage citizens to act in preferred
ways, through default options or small incentives designed into
social processes or institutions, rather than by introducing explicit
rules or directives. In effect, it creates an illusion of choice, seeking
to achieve collective goals without directly challenging the neo-
liberal paradigm. Constraining high carbon mobility – in the way
that A New Deal for Transport sought to constrain road transport –
has given way to an emphasis on encouragement of alternatives.
This approach is evident in the DfT’s recent ‘Smarter Choices’
programme, comprising
techniques for inﬂuencing people’s travel behaviour towards more
sustainable options such as encouraging school, workplace and
individualised travel planning […] improve public transport and
marketing services such as travel awareness campaigns, setting up
websites for car share schemes, supporting car clubs and encoura-
ging teleworking. (DfT, 2011a)
In the UK this is now the primary policy method for achieving
more sustainable travel patterns. The 2020 ﬁgure of a 5% reduction
in car-kms assumed by the CCC is based on the achievements of
the DfT’s Sustainable Travel Towns programme, which ran in three
towns between 2004–2009 (Sloman et al. 2010). Reductions in
national trafﬁc of up to 11% over 10 years are thought to be
possible (Cairns et al., 2008). This is one of the few elements in UK
national transport planning to generate empirical evidence that
sustained absolute reductions in travel or emissions can be
achieved.
Concerns have been raised, however, about the implementation
of nudge approaches (e.g. Bonell et al., 2011; Marteau et al., 2011).
A key example, highly relevant to transport, is the question of
what happens when a nudge meets a larger force pushing in the
opposite direction. While getting people to switch from cars and to
public transport is a central element of the Smarter Choices
approach, the car has an established and powerful hold on
precisely the same subconscious processes that are targeted by
nudge:
Cars provide status to their owners through their various sign-
values that include speed, home, safety, sexual success, career
achievement, freedom, family, masculinity and even genetic
breeding. (Urry, 2008, p. 116)
Car advertising is a constantly regenerated source of such
images, reinforcing concepts like “driving pleasure” (Hagman,
2010).The ubiquitous promotion of this “car culture” (Owens and
Cowell, 2011, p. 103) dwarfs anything that government informa-
tion campaigns, like those in the Sustainable Travel Towns
programme, could hope to achieve. It is not just cars that are
promoted, but also behaviours that require cars, or other high
carbon transportation (Urry, 2010): television shows encouraging
‘Escape to the Country’ (and the extended commute and distances to
services that follow), or newspapers’ exotic holiday supplements.
Governments do not hold a monopoly over the methods
advocated by Nudge. Nudges are a primary means through which
growth is pursued in a consumer society: encouraging consump-
tion by promoting (predicting) consumer desires, and providing
for their fulﬁlment. The public are not blind to the contradictions
between messages of consumption and carbon reduction, and so a
degree of cynicism and inaction can be expected (Butler, 2010;
Webb, 2012). Such contradictions threaten nudge approaches
more widely. While the construction of cycle paths is an important
step towards providing an alternative to car travel, the promotion
of car culture remains a hindrance to uptake. Government cam-
paigns ebb and ﬂow, but promotion of the status quo (i.e. car
dominance) remains constant.
The demands of a growth-focused economy impact transport
indirectly as well, with the result that individuals are ‘nudged’
away from low carbon behaviours. Land use is a critical dimension
of travel demand, being fundamental to the context in which
people make travel mode decisions. It is clear, for example, that
low-density urban sprawl is tightly intertwined with private car
use, as America’s twentieth century demonstrates (Kopecky and
Suen, 2010).
The 2012 National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), 2012)
represents a major change to land use policy in the UK. It identiﬁes
the need for “promoting sustainable transport” but its priority is
clear: “At the heart of the National Planning Policy Framework is a
presumption in favour of sustainable development” (ibid. p. 4).
Planning should operate to encourage and not act as an impedi-
ment to sustainable growth. Therefore signiﬁcant weight should be
placed on the need to support economic growth through the
planning system (ibid. p. 6).
Fig. 5. New motorway and trunk road building by lane kilometres (DfT, 2012).
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The key term here is ‘sustainable’, a word tasked with mediat-
ing between current market demands and future wellbeing.
Speaking on the draft of the NPPF, former Chairman of the
Sustainable Development Commission, Jonathan Porritt, said:
Anybody who claims sustainable development is dead when
you’ve government uttering the words more often than any
government has done before would be in a difﬁcult place […]
[S]ustainable development isn’t dead in that it doesn’t have any
role in this government. What is really problematic is the degree to
which what they mean by sustainable development is actually
counter to what sustainable development really means (Porritt,
2011).
Far from ensuring land use planning achieves spatial organisa-
tions that minimise the need for high carbon mobility, the NPPF
subordinates transport planning to economic growth. The NPPF
aspires to give people “a real choice about how they travel” (DCLG,
2012, p. 9) without acknowledging that the ability to exercise
choice is constrained by the planning framework, or lack thereof.
If handing precedence to growth and consumer choice results in
urban sprawl (Garlick, 2012), the construction of cycle lanes is
unlikely to spur desirable behaviour changes in commuters facing
lengthening journeys.
Ultimately, behavioural interventions are hamstrung by highly
resourced, entrenched socio-technical cultures of consumption
(Shove, 2003); “a powerfully seductive culture that promotes individual
acquisitiveness and routinely places emphasis on the immediate
and/or short term, on individual self-interest and material well-being”
(Smart, 2011, p. 132). As long as society remains conﬁgured around
consumption-based growth, it is difﬁcult to envisage how limited,
nudge-based, behavioural interventions can have any lasting impact
on transport emissions in a political culture where policy makers feel
increasingly unable to ‘interfere’ with ‘sovereign consumers’. Indeed,
current government rhetoric is of “ending the war on motorists”, by
discarding some of the very measures – parking space limits and
parking charges – previously advocated by the DfT (DCLG, 2011).
In this environment, there seems little possibility of achieving the
required behaviour change-sourced reductions in transport emissions.
7. The technology ﬁx
The alternative weapon in the neoliberal policy maker’s
armoury is that of technology. If the energy propelling transport
can be decarbonised, the sector’s direct threat to climatic stability
can be addressed (though not other costs, such as congestion).
Markets are commonly lauded for their ability to drive technolo-
gical innovation, so there might be grounds for optimism within
the current paradigm that technical solutions can be found to the
problem of high carbon mobility.
‘Rebound effects’ challenge such optimism however. These
concern the relationship between efﬁciency of resource use and
market demand. Improvements in efﬁciency spur demand, while
demand shapes how efﬁciency is utilised (for example, as
improved fuel economy or increased comfort). The result is that
savings are less than expected. In certain cases the increase in
demand can eclipse savings, referred to as “backﬁre” (Breakthrough
Institute, 2011).
Rebound works at several levels (ibid.). Direct rebound occurs
when efﬁciency improvements in a service reduce costs and
stimulate demand. Indirect rebound sees the wealth saved from
the greater efﬁciency invested in another area of the economy.
Notably, the smaller the direct rebound effect, the more saved
wealth is available to power indirect rebound. There are also
macroeconomic effects, which are unpredictable system-level
impacts. One example is the ‘frontier effect’, where efﬁciency
improvement leads to the creation of entirely new products and
markets: improvements in battery technology for electric vehicles
could spur a raft of new consumer goods along with associated
energy demands.
A meta-analysis of the impact of efﬁciency improvements on
the distance travelled by cars puts the direct rebound effect at
10–30% (Sorrell, 2007, p. 31), which is signiﬁcant, given the ambition
of targeted emissions cuts. Moreover, these studies do not account
for indirect effects. In regard to car travel, major indirect effects are
changes in vehicle design, and rates of occupancy (Moriarty and
Honnery, 2008). Increases in engine power; power demand from
auxiliary features such as air conditioning and in-car entertain-
ment; and weight from safety features like roll cages, have all
contributed to rebound effects. The potential scale of such backﬁre
is demonstrated by the ﬁnding that US ﬂeet-average fuel efﬁciency
of Ford cars is now lower than that of the Model T 80 years ago
(Woodcock et al., 2007, p. 1085).
Some relief for transport planners, if not travellers, comes from
the fact that rebound relies on below-cost improvements. If the
cost of the new technology equals or exceeds the saving made,
then no demand stimulation is created. In regard to home energy
use, the CCC expect efﬁciency cost savings through to 2020 to be
offset by rising energy prices (CCC, 2010, p. 42). The rising costs
associated with extracting increasingly hard-to-reach sources of
crude oil suggest that transport will face similar pressures.
In addition, the current preferred option for decarbonising transport
is the electric vehicle, which is likely to remain more expensive than
established technologies for the foreseeable future. Fuel taxes can
also be utilised to prevent direct rebound effects, and universal
carbon taxes could inhibit indirect effects.
This raises a difﬁculty for the growth paradigm, however, as
low energy prices are an essential enabler of economic growth
(Brown et al., 2011). If new low carbon technologies are more
expensive than common energy systems have been historically,
and if – as in the case of oil – existing fuels themselves increase in
cost, then achieving targeted growth rates becomes highly difﬁ-
cult, if not impossible. Given the reliance of the existing paradigm
on expanding GDP to maintain socio-economic stability such a
development would generate acute pressure on government to
shift policy away from carbon reduction.
If energy prices can be kept low enough to enable future
economic growth, and adverse rebound effects mitigated through
instruments such as carbon taxes, what would the energy supply
of UK transport in 2050 look like? The CCC targets conventional
car efﬁciency of 80 gCO2/km in 2030, a marked improvement on
the current average of 170 gCO2/km, but achievable with the
right incentives (indeed such improvements have driven the
relative decoupling of passenger transport in recent years). How-
ever, the only hope for the absolute decoupling of transport and
emissions is the widespread electriﬁcation of vehicles (CCC, 2010;
DfT, 2011b) which offers the possibility of entirely removing direct
emissions from transport. The issue then becomes indirect emis-
sions. Mackay (2009)(p. 198) calculates that electrifying all UK
road vehicles, as envisaged by CCC targets for 2050, would create
an additional 60 GW of electricity demand, which equals current
peak demand. Demand management could spread out competing
loads, but some 45 GW of additional capacity would still be
required (ibid p. 206).
The point to be made here is not that the UK cannot meet the
demands of an entirely electriﬁed transport network – though
the physical limits of energy production are given far less con-
sideration than they warrant (Brown et al., 2011) – but that it will
come at considerable political, economic, environmental and
social cost. Given the difﬁculties that successive UK Governments
have experienced in simply replacing current energy production,
the notion of creating an additional 75% capacity in less than 40
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years should caution anyone assuming decarbonisation offers a
painless ‘techno-ﬁx’.
8. Conclusions
The ‘absurd scenario’ set out by Adams (1981), pp. 204–206 is
still discernible in UK Government forecasts, despite its conﬂict
with ofﬁcial emissions targets. Growth forecasts have been tem-
pered, so that in place of the 3% GDP growth driving 2% freight
growth identiﬁed by Adams, the CCC presumes 2.2% GDP growth
leading 0.5% freight growth, and 1% total road trafﬁc growth (2010,
p. 157). This is of course the same “up and to the right” (Bleecker,
2009, p. 17) vision of perpetual future growth, and is ultimately no
less absurd, just absurd on a longer time scale. However, the true
lesson of Adams’ scenario is found in its vision of a UK reduced to a
“tarmac plain”: that as much as perpetual growth is unachievable,
it is, in its costs, also fundamentally undesirable.
The solution proffered by government planning is that of
absolute decoupling: economic growth without breaching limits.
TDM was intended to achieve this, and certainly some relative
decoupling was achieved during subsequent years. Evidence of the
necessary absolute decoupling is harder to ﬁnd. Notably, it was
achieved for private car use in the decade following the White
Paper, however growth in other modes kept overall levels stable.
Overall, emissions continued to rise, particularly once interna-
tional travel is accounted for.
Furthermore, even these isolated successes may not be sus-
tained, for the central planning required by transport demand
management quickly fell from favour in under successive neolib-
eral governments. Though it is no longer ﬁxated solely on cars, the
market-responsive predict and provide that has re-emerged
remains fundamentally unchanged. The largest project on the
DfT’s books – HS2 – is being presented as sustainable develop-
ment, while creating the same inﬂationary demands as the road
building programme of the 1980s. Rebound effects can be
expected to bolster travel, just as they threaten to do if fuel
efﬁciency measures make travel cheaper. Meanwhile, in an effort
to boost growth in the face of current economic woes, land use
reform is being pursued in ways that will likely encourage urban
sprawl and reliance on private cars.
The result is the pursuit of absolute decoupling through
‘nudging’ behaviour against the force of countervailing ‘shoves’
from entrenched socio-technical systems of consumer culture, and
optimistic techno ﬁxes which come with their own conﬂicts.
Achieving the CCC’s (2008, 2010) desired decarbonised transport
system will require abutting numerous other limits: political,
social, economic, spatial and environmental. This is the lesson of
the tarmac plain.
While UK emissions are only a small contributor to the global
total, the reduction targets it has set in law make it an important
test case for other developed economies, and the potential con-
sequences of a failure to achieve those targets are greater. Eighty
per cent reductions by 2050 are entirely achievable, if the means
are not subservient to efforts to boost growth. Targets might be
achievable with economic growth, but no comprehensive account
yet exists of how this might be possible. Given the difﬁculties
generated by growth ideology, the evidence that growth in and of
itself may be irrelevant to wellbeing in developed economies (e.g.
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), and questions as to whether
continued growth is even possible (e.g. Heinberg, 2011; Murray
and King, 2012), we must surely begin a reassessment of the
nature of transport planning.
Predict and provide road building was abandoned because,
from the holistic perspective taken by A New Deal for Transport, its
costs were simply too great. However, like so many of the
innovations of the early years of the Blair governments, it fell
victim to the loss of conﬁdence in the possibility of social
democratic management of markets in pursuit of wider social
goals. The limits that it recognised remain however, and as this
paper has demonstrated, there is good reason to be highly
sceptical that the CCC’s attempts to resolve tensions through
decoupling are achievable.
As it becomes more apparent that states cannot, in the longer-
term, remain passive as future directions are determined by
markets, there is surely a case to be argued for renewed transport
demand management, based on holistic perspectives that make
explicit reconciliation of efﬁciency with equity and sustainability.
This will require an approach that starts from the more funda-
mental question of mobility rather than from the second-order
questions of transport (Urry, 2008).
The mobility agenda sees the demand for movement at all
scales as the result of a set of societal choices about values and
social organization, rather than the ineluctable working out of
impersonal market forces. Transport is simply one of the ways in
which to realise the consequences of those choices. Mobility asks
us to examine how and why certain patterns of movement have
come to be regarded as fundamental to the societies in which we
live, and whose voices and interests have come to dominate in that
assessment. Rather than envisioning the future in terms of the
past – by rolling historic statistics endlessly onwards into the
future – it asks what kind of a future (or range of futures) might
we want for ourselves and how major infrastructure investments
might, or might not, contribute to that. This process necessarily
rests on a more comprehensive and democratic process of public
engagement than on the pretence that the econometric models of
state actors locked into the growth paradigm can deliver an
objective and impartial solution for the optimum route from here
to there. Instead, a wider set of questions must be asked about
where ‘there’ is. Once initiated, such a conversation seems unlikely
to settle on the tarmac plain as a preferred destination.
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